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Abstract
Postgraduate degree holders experience lower cyclical wage vari-
ation than those with undergraduate degrees. Moreover, postgradu-
ates have more specific human capital than undergraduates. Using
an equilibrium search model with long-term contracts and imperfect
monitoring of worker effort, this paper attributes the cyclicality of the
postgraduate-undergraduate wage gap to the differences in specific cap-
ital. Imperfect monitoring creates a moral hazard problem that requires
firms to pay efficiency wages. More specific capital leads to lower mo-
bility, thereby alleviating the moral hazard and improving risk-sharing.
Estimates reveal that specific capital explains the differences both in
labour turnover and in wage cyclicality across education groups.
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1 Introduction
Firms can provide employment contracts to insure workers from aggregate
shocks (Azariadis, 1975; Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991). Significant research
efforts have been devoted to characterizing optimal contracts in frictional
labour markets (Burdett and Coles, 2003; Rudanko, 2009; Menzio and Shi,
2011). While it has been recognized that workers with more specific human
capital face lower cyclical variation in employment than unskilled workers
(Cairó and Cajner, 2016), little evidence is available on the relative variation
of their wages. In this paper, I build an equilibrium search model to study the
impact of specific human capital on wage variation over the business cycle.
Then, I apply this model to explain novel stylised facts about the cyclicality
of the postgraduate wage premium.
Beginning with the data, can education provide shelter against wage
shocks over the business cycle? As the employment share held by post-
graduates has doubled since 1980, I compare postgraduates to those with
only undergraduate degrees and document a new result: In the US, the
postgraduate-undergraduate wage premium is counter-cyclical.1 To illus-
trate, Figure 1 plots the detrended real GDP and the postgraduate wage
premium.2 The postgraduate wage premium increases substantially during
all recent recessions, and its correlation with real GDP is -0.47. Table 1
reports that when real GDP goes up by 1%, the median postgraduate wage
increases by 0.34%, and the median undergraduate wage increases by 0.58%,
indicating that postgraduate wages respond less to business cycle shocks than
undergraduate wages.3 Table 1 also shows that both the college-noncollege
1Postgraduate degrees include masters, Ph.D., and professional degrees. Lindley and
Machin (2016) document that in 2012 nearly 15% of the adult workforce, or 40% of all
college graduates, have a postgraduate degree. As I discuss further in my review of the
literature, the existing literature analyzes the cyclicality of the college-noncollege wage
premium, and finds it to be acyclical.
2See Appendix A for a description of the data.
3In terms of means, when real GDP goes up by 1%, the average postgraduate wage
increases by 0.25%, and the average undergraduate wage increases by 0.85%.
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wage premium and the undergraduate-noncollege wage premium are largely
acyclical.4 Therefore, education can provide insurance against cyclical wage
shocks only if a postgraduate degree is obtained.
Figure 1: Detrended Real GDP and Postgraduate Wage Premium
Current Population Survey March Supplement (March CPS) 1976–2016, males,
aged 26–64. NBER dated recessions are shaded. Series are logged and detrended
using a Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter with parameter 100.
Furthermore, I find that the difference in wage cyclicality between post-
graduates and undergraduates is significant for workers with a long tenure
in a given job, but not for new hires.5 As workers’ job tenure is the gener-
ally used proxy for specific human capital (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987), I
argue that this phenomenon occurs because experienced postgraduates accu-
mulate more specific capital in their jobs than their undergraduate degree-
4The undergraduate-noncollege wage premium is weakly pro-cyclical in the mean, while
it is acyclical in the median and the top 25%. As is argued by Lindquist (2004), the median
wage premium is a more suitable measure of the correlation between output and the wage
premium than the mean wage premium, because composition bias and top-coding have a
smaller impact on the median wage premium.
5I show that the counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium is due neither to cyclical
changes in the composition of the workforce, nor to postgraduates and undergraduates
sorting into different industries and occupations.
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Table 1: Elasticity with respect to GDP
Wage Wage Premium
Postgrad Undergrad Noncollege Postgrad
Undergrad
Undergrad
Noncollege
College
Noncollege
Median .34 .58 .57 -.24 .01 .03
(.14) (.16) (.12) (.14) (.14) (.13)
Top25% .04 .71 .53 -.67 .18 -.03
(.19) (.15) (.11) (.16) (.12) (.12)
Mean .25 .85 .50 -.60 .35 .12
(.18) (.17) (.12) (.18) (.15) (.13)
Wages are deflated to constant 2000 dollars. College = undergraduates + post-
graduates.
holding counterparts, and thus, they are offered contracts with smoother
wages. Since new hires have not yet built any specific capital, the difference
in wage cyclicality between postgraduates and undergraduates is small. I
provide empirical evidence showing postgraduates have more specific capital
in two dimensions: the size of specific capital that new hires have to build and
the time needed for this process. First, with regard to the time dimension,
I construct a new measurement using the data on the adaptation period in
a new job: newly hired postgraduates need 58.5 weeks to become fully com-
petent, twice as long as the time needed by undergraduates. Second, with
regard to the size dimension, Dustmann and Meghir (2005) argue that more
specific capital leads to larger wage losses from exogenous job displacement.
I show that displaced postgraduates suffer an average wage loss of 17.8%,
twice as much of a loss as undergraduates.
To understand how specific capital affects labour turnover and wage cycli-
cality, I develop a directed search model of wage contracting and firm com-
mitment, based on the work of Tsuyuhara (2016) and Lamadon (2016). I
depart by adding specific human capital and aggregate shocks to matches. I
assume new hires have zero endowment of any specific capital, which they
obtain through a period of job adaptation. In the model, risk-neutral firms
provide long-term contracts, and risk-averse workers choose their effort level
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to avoid job separation. If effort were observable, because of the difference
in risk aversion, firms would bear all the risk, offer constant wages, and pre-
scribe constant effort. I assume worker effort is unobserved by firms (Azari-
adis, 1975). With this assumption, workers might shirk. Firms pay efficiency
wages to induce them to provide the optimal level of effort.
The optimal contract is such that wage changes track aggregate produc-
tivity shocks: When aggregate productivity increases, firms increase wages
of workers to incentivize them to make a greater effort. I show that the
effort level of skilled workers increases with specific human capital: After
gaining specific capital, skilled workers have strong incentives to keep their
jobs longer. As these incentives increase with the level of specific capital,
skilled workers with more specific capital make a greater effort to avoid job
separation.
I further show that wage smoothing of skilled workers increases with
specific capital. On the one hand, as skilled workers with more specific capital
are less likely to leave their current jobs, they will value more about firms’
promises of future wage changes. As wage changes becomes more effective
in motivating workers, firms do not need to give workers a lot of incentives.
Intuitively, firms do not have to increase wages to keep them in booms. On
the other hand, as the level of effort increases with the level of specific capital,
the response of effort to increased incentives decreases. Then, it becomes
increasingly costly for firms to provide incentives for worker effort. Firms
face the trade-off between insurance and incentives. As more specific capital
increases both the effectiveness and the marginal cost of providing incentives,
it becomes optimal for firms to provide more insurance to workers with more
specific capital, i.e. smaller wage changes caused by changes in aggregate
productivity.
Although the model is parsimonious, it can endogenously generate the
differences in both labour turnover and wage cyclicality across education
groups, given the observed empirical differences in specific human capital.
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Additionally, my paper implies that lower educated workers, and even un-
dergraduates, are unlikely to receive much insurance from firms, thereby,
increasing the demand for social insurance among this group. I conduct a
counterfactual policy experiment to raise the unemployment insurance (UI)
replacement rate by 20%. I find that this policy increases wage cyclicality,
indicating UI crowds out the implicit insurance provided by firms. However,
the effect is less pronounced for lower educated workers than for postgradu-
ates. Lower educated workers have a higher welfare gain than postgraduates
from such a policy, which supports the argument for a lower UI replacement
rate for postgraduates.
Related Literature
A large literature has studied the extent to which workers can insure them-
selves against uncertain labour income (see e.g. Krueger and Perri, 2005,
2006; Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante, 2005; Blundell, Pistaferri and
Preston, 2008). This paper explores where income shocks arises from in the
first place, and argues that postgraduates get more firm insurance than other
education groups because they have more specific capital.
The theoretical literature on how specific capital affects wage cyclicality is
inconclusive. Azariadis (1976) studies long-term contracts with commitment
and implies that firms are more willing to offer constant wages to workers
with more specific capital. On the other hand, Hashimoto (1975) and Raisian
(1979) study implicit contracts with lack of commitment and imply that
workers with more specific capital accept higher cyclical fluctuations in wages
in return for higher employment security. My work extends this literature
by showing that, in an economy with search frictions and firm commitment,
workers with more specific capital are offered contracts with smoother wages.
In the search literature, Hudomiet (2015) and Cairó and Cajner (2016)
evaluate the effect of specific capital on employment and labour turnover. To
my knowledge, the current paper is the first to quantify the effect of specific
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capital on both labour turnover and wage cyclicality.
This paper contributes to the literature that studies the cyclicality of
education wage premium. Keane and Prasad (1993) and Lindquist (2004)
compare wage cyclicality between noncollege workers and college graduates,
a group which includes both undergraduates and postgraduates. They find
that both types of workers experience the same degree of cyclical wage shocks,
i.e. that the college wage premium is acyclical. I confirm their result, but
show that the cyclicality emerges once undergraduates and postgraduates are
considered separately.
Outline
Section 2 and 3 provide empirical evidence on wage cyclicality and specific
capital. Section 4 presents the equilibrium search model. In Section 5, I
outline the estimation strategy, discuss the identification, and report the
estimation results. In Section 6, I analyze the estimated model and report
the counterfactual simulations. Section 7 evaluates the counterfactual policy.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence on Wage Cyclicality
In this section, I use individual-level data to compare the wage cyclicality
between postgraduates and undergraduates, controlling for observed char-
acteristics. Then, I study the relationship between the cyclicality of the
postgraduat wage premium and job tenure.
2.1 Regression of Wage on Degree Interaction
To estimate the effects of postgraduate degree on the wage cyclicality, I follow
Keane and Prasad (1993) and run the regression of log real hourly wage
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lnWit = θPGit + αUt + γPGit × Ut +Xitβ + εit (1)
where PGit is a postgraduate degree dummy, which equals 1 if the worker
has a postgraduate degree and 0 if he only has an undergraduate degree.
I use the aggregate unemployment rate in the economy, Ut, as an indica-
tor of the business cycle.6 α measures the cyclicality of the undergraduate
wage. For instance, a negative estimate of α would imply that the average
real wage of undergraduates declines when the aggregate unemployment rate
rises, i.e. the undergraduate wage is pro-cyclical. The coefficient γ on the
interaction term PGit ×Ut captures the difference between the cyclicality of
the postgraduate wage and the undergraduate wage, and α+γ measures the
cyclicality of the postgraduate wage. A positive estimate of γ would indi-
cate a counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium — the premium increases
when the unemployment rate rises. Xit is a vector of observables including
state dummies, a race dummy, a marriage dummy, a cubic age trend and a
quartic time trend.
Empirical Results
Table 2 presents the estimates from regression (1). I use the 1976-2016 March
CPS and restrict the sample to males aged 26-64 not self-employed. I further
restrict the above sample to postgraduates and undergraduates only. The
sample size is 364,864 individuals. Following Robin (2011), the unemploy-
ment rate is successively log-transformed, HP-filtered and exponentiated. I
HP-filter the annual series with a conventional smoothing parameter 100.
The results are robust to the detrending method.7
The first column of Table 2 shows the regression result on log real hourly
6The results are not affected by choice of the business cycle. See the discussion in the
next section.
7I also detrend the unemployment rate using a cubic trend and obtain very similar
results. See column (2) of Table 13 in Appendix B.1.
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Table 2: Regression on Degree Interaction
Data March CPS 76-16 PSID 85-15
Method OLS FE
Dependent lnWage lnHour lnEarnings lnWage
URATE (α) -.0124 -.0064 -.0188 -.0125
(.0012) (.0007) (.0015) (.0032)
PG× URATE (γ) .0086 .0035 .0121 .0120
(.0021) (.0011) (.0024) (.0062)
α + γ -.0038 -.0029 -.0067 -.0005
(.0017) (.0009) (.0019) (.0053)
Observations 364,864 12,692
wages. Hourly wages are computed as annual labour earnings divided by
annual hours, and are deflated to constant 2000 dollars. The estimated coef-
ficient α on the unemployment rate is -0.0124 (s.e. 0.0012), indicating that a
1 percentage point rise in the aggregate unemployment rate causes a 1.24%
decline in the real wage for undergraduates. Thus, the undergraduate wage
is strongly pro-cyclical. The estimated coefficient γ on the interaction term
PGit × Ut is 0.0086 (s.e. 0.0021), indicating that when the unemployment
rate goes up by 1 percentage point in a downturn, postgraduates face a 0.86%
increase in their real wage relative to that of undergraduates. Therefore, the
postgraduate wage premium is counter-cyclical. The sum of the coefficients α
and γ is -0.0038 (s.e. 0.0017), indicating that a 1 percentage point rise in the
unemployment rate causes a 0.38% decline in the postgraduate wage, which
is less pro-cyclical than the undergraduate wage. I also experiment with
other indicators of the business cycle, such as log real GDP. I find that when
real GDP increases by 1%, the average real hourly wage for postgraduates
increases by 0.403% and that for undergraduates increases by 0.988%. See
column (1) of Table 13 in Appendix B.1 for the estimates. Column (3)-(5) of
the same table presents robustness checks, including median regression and
regression by age groups, all confirming my finding that the postgraduate
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wage is in fact less pro-cyclical than the undergraduate wage.8
Hours and Earnings
The second column of Table 2 provides estimates of the cyclicality of annual
hours worked. The estimation framework is identical to that used for real
hourly wages (Equation 1). The coefficient on Ut is -0.0064 (s.e. 0.0007) and
the coefficient on PGit×Ut is 0.0035 (s.e. 0.0011). Thus, for postgraduates,
annual hours worked are less procyclical than those for undergraduates. The
difference in the cyclicality of hours between undergraduates and postgrad-
uates is smaller than that of wages. The third column of Table 2 shows
estimates of cyclicality of annual labour earnings. When the unemployment
rate goes up by 1 percentage point, the real earnings of undergraduates fall
by 1.88%, and those of postgraduates fall by 0.67%. Postgraduate earnings
are less pro-cyclical than undergraduate earnings. In conjunction, these re-
sults suggest that postgraduates have smoother wages, hours, and earnings
than undergraduates.
Selection Bias
The typical selection bias problem in this type of analysis is: undergraduates
are more likely to be unemployed than postgraduates during recessions, so
the relative wage of undergraduates increases mechanically. This is contrary
to my finding. Furthermore, the unemployment rates for both undergrad-
uates and postgraduates are less than 3% (Table 6), which illustrates the
limited effect of the selection bias problem. However, to eliminate such sys-
tematic selection regardless, I focus on job stayers – workers who stayed in
the same job last year, did not look for work during that period, and worked
for 52 weeks. This essentially compares average postgraduates with good
8Figure 4 in Appendix B.3 plots wage growth rates in booms and recessions. Under-
graduates have a larger wage growth rate than postgraduates in booms and a smaller wage
growth rate than postgraduates in recessions.
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undergraduates, so the estimated coefficient should be smaller. Column (6)
of Table 13shows that the estimated coefficient γ shrinks slightly to 0.0069.
To further support my findings, I run Heckman (1979) selection model with
a first-stage probit employment equation.9 The estimates are in Column (7)
of same table, which is similar to the baseline.
Industries and Occupations
Table 14 in Appendix B.2 presents the estimates from the wage regression
by major industries and occupations. This can be used to check whether
this phenomenon occurs because postgraduates and undergraduates sort into
different industries and occupations, which are subject to different cyclical
shocks in productivity. I find that the postgraduate wage premium is counter-
cyclical in all major industries and in 4 out of 7 major occupations.10 In
addition, I also check how the coefficient γ on PGit × Ut shrinks after con-
trolling for interactions between Ut and industries and occupations in Table
15 in the same appendix. The more this coefficient shrinks, the more indus-
tries and occupations can explain the counter-cyclicality postgraduate wage
premium. I find that γ shrinks to 0.0065 and 0.0052 after controlling for
3-digit industries and occupations respectively.
Individual Fixed-Effects
I also run regression 1 with individual fixed-effects controlling for a cubic
age trend and a quartic time trend. I use the 1985–2015 Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) and restrict the sample to male heads aged 26-64
not self-employed. The last column of Table 2 presents the estimates. The
estimated coefficient α on the unemployment rate Ut is -0.0125 (s.e. 0.0032)
9The variables included in the first-stage employment equation but excluded from wage
equation are: number of own children in the household, number of own children under age
5 in the household, and age of youngest own child in the household.
10These occupations include Managerial, Professional Specialty, Technical, and Sales,
which added up to 82% of all college graduates.
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indicating that a 1 percentage point rise in the aggregate unemployment
rate causes a 1.25% decline in the real hourly wage for undergraduates.11
The estimated coefficient γ on the interaction term PGit × Ut is 0.0120 (s.e.
0.0062) indicating that when the unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage
point, postgraduates face a 1.2% increase in their real wage relative to that
of undergraduates, which confirms that the postgraduate wage premium is
counter-cyclical.
2.2 Job Tenure and Specific Capital
Is there a link between counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium and job
tenure? I test for it using PSID, which is particularly advantageous here
because of the information it provides on the length of uninterrupted tenure
on the current job. I run the following fixed-effects regression of log wage on
interactions between Ut, PGit and length of tenure
lnWit = ShortTenureit × (α1Ut + γ1PGit × Ut) (2)
+ (1− ShortTenureit)× (α2Ut + γ2PGit × Ut) +Xitβ + µi + εit
where ShortTenureit is a dummy on the length of tenure, which equals 1 if
the worker has at most κ years of uninterrupted tenure on the current job and
equals 0 if he has a longer tenure. µi stands for unobserved individual-specific
characteristics that are fixed over time. Xit includes a cubic age trend and a
quartic time trend. For new hires, the coefficient α1 measures the cyclicality
of the undergraduate wage, and γ1 measures the difference in wage cyclicality
between postgraduates and undergraduates. For workers with a long tenure,
11Using 1968-1992 PSID, Swanson (2007) regress log real hourly wage on the unemploy-
ment rate without distinguishing education levels. He finds that a 1 percentage point rise
in the aggregate unemployment rate causes a 1.22% decline in the real wage, which is of
the similar magnitude as my estimates.
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the coefficients α2 measures the cyclicality of the undergraduate wage, and
γ2 measures the difference in wage cyclicality between postgraduates and
undergraduates.
I restrict the sample to male heads aged 26-64 not self-employed. First,
following Altonji and Williams (2005), I set ShortTenure as, at most, 1.5
years of tenure. The estimates are presented in the Column “κ = 1.5” of
Table 3. For new hires, the estimated coefficient γ1 on the interaction term
PGit × Ut has the positive sign but is not significant. For workers with a
long tenure, the estimated coefficient γ2 is significantly positive, indicating
that postgraduates have smaller wage cyclicality than undergraduates. γ2
is significantly larger than γ1 indicates that the difference in wage cyclical-
ity between postgraduates and undergraduates is higher for workers with a
long tenure than new hires. Then, in the Column “κ = 2” and κ = 2.5”,
I set ShortTenure as, at most, 2 years of tenure and 2.5 years of tenure
respectively. The results are not changed.
A worker’s job tenure is the generally used proxy for specific human cap-
ital (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Topel, 1991). Thus, this phenomenon is
consistent with a story of specific capital: Postgraduates accumulate more
specific capital in their jobs than undergraduates. As new hires have not
yet built any specific capital, the difference in wage cyclicality between post-
graduates and undergraduates is small. As workers with a long tenure have
accumulated specific human capital, the difference in wage cyclicality is large.
3 Empirical Evidence on Specific Capital
In previous sections, I showed that postgraduates have smoother wages than
undergraduates over the business cycle, and that this effect is stronger for
workers with a long tenure than new hires. My theory for this phenomenon
is that postgraduates have more specific capital which reduces their wage
cyclicality. Specific capital has two dimensions: the size of the specific capital
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Table 3: Fixed-effect Regressions by Job Tenure
lnWage κ = 1.5 κ = 2 κ = 2.5
ShortTenure
URATE (α1) -.0172 -.0151 -.0160
(.0075) (.0065) (.0062)
PG× URATE (γ1) .0052 .0059 .0052
(.0068) (.0066) (.0066)
1− ShortTenure
URATE (α2) -.0118 -.0123 -.0122
(.0035) (.0035) (.0036)
PG× URATE (γ2) .0111 .0114 .0118
(.0062) (.0062) (.0062)
γ2 − γ1 .0059 .0054 .0066
(.0030) (.0027) (.0027)
Observations 12,692
Workers 1,804
PSID 1985-2015, males heads, aged 26–64, not self-employed. “κ = 1.5”:
ShortTenure is set as, at most, 1.5 years of tenure. “κ = 2”: ShortTenure is
set as, at most, 2 years of tenure. “κ = 2.5”: ShortTenure is set as, at most, 2.5
years of tenure. Controls: a cubic age trend and a quartic time trend.
that new hires have to build and the time needed for this process. In what
follows, I show that postgraduates have more specific capital in these two
dimensions.
3.1 Job Adaptation
First, I study the time it takes to accumulate specific capital. I construct a
new measurement in a US employer survey – the Multi-City Study of Urban
Inequality (MCSUI), which measures how long it takes new hires to be fully
competent in their jobs. I call this measurement the adaptation period in a
new job.
The MCSUI was conducted between 1992 and 1994, in the middle of the
time period with which this paper is concerned. The survey asked employers
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a series of specific questions about the last new employee the company hired.
One of these questions proves particularly useful for analyzing adaptation
duration. The question reads “How many weeks does it take the typical em-
ployee in this position to become fully competent in it?” Table 4 provides
descriptive statistics on this measure of the time dimension of specific cap-
ital. The results show a considerable difference between postgraduates and
undergraduates: a newly hired postgraduate needs 58.5 weeks on average
to become fully competent, which is twice as long as the time needed for a
newly hired undergraduate (29.2 weeks). The difference is significant at the
one percent level. Thus, postgraduates have a longer duration of job adap-
tation than undergraduates. A newly hired noncollege worker needs 22.5
weeks to become fully competent, which is about 80% of the time needed for
a newly hired undergraduate. Therefore, the difference in the duration of job
adaptation between postgraduates and undergraduates is much larger than
that between undergraduates and noncollege workers.
Table 4: Job Adaptation Duration by Education
Education Noncollege Undergrad. Postgrad.
Weeks until competent 22.5 29.2 58.5
(.88) (2.32) (8.98)
Observations 2566 515 159
MCSUI 1992-1994.
3.2 Wage Loss from Job Displacement
With regard to the size dimension, Dustmann and Meghir (2005) argue that
more specific capital leads to larger wage losses from exogenous job displace-
ment. I examine this implication using the 1994-2008 Displaced Workers
Survey (DWS), which is a supplement to the CPS. The DWS identifies dis-
placed workers who have been separated from their employers for reasons of
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slack work, plant closings, and abolished jobs — reasons which have been
taken by the literature to instrument for “exogenous” layoffs. The DWS
records information on earnings on both the displaced and current job. I
construct a sample of male workers who were involuntarily displaced from
a full-time job last year and who were reemployed in a full-time job at the
time of their interview.
In Table 5, I show the change in log wages across the current job and
the displaced job. The resulting statistics represent the fraction of a typical
worker’s wage that would be lost if he was exogenously removed from his
current match and left to find a new job. Percent losses in wages are signif-
icant from zero for all education levels, showing a sizable productivity gap
between new hires and experienced workers. The percent losses in wages are
significantly larger for postgraduates than undergraduates at the ten percent
level, and the difference is substantial: -0.178 for postgraduates, twice as
large as that for displaced undergraduates (-0.086). The difference between
undergraduates and noncollege workers is not significant. In Section 4, by
targeting the percent losses in wages for displaced workers by education, I
estimate the initial productivity gaps of new hires in my model, which is
indeed higher for postgraduates than for undergraduates.
Table 5: Wage Loss from Job Displacement by Education
Education Noncollege Undergrad. Postgrad.
E (logwt − logwt−1) -.086 -.086 -.178
(.013) (.030) (.060)
Observations 2576 543 210
DWS 1994-2008, males who were involuntarily displaced from a full-time job last
year and are reemployed in a full-time job now.
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3.3 Worker Flows
Table 6 shows unemployment rates and worker flows for males aged 26-64.
Postgraduates have lower unemployment rate than undergraduates. Their
job separation rate is 0.46%, which is 50% lower than that of undergradu-
ates. The job finding rate of postgraduates is 24.5%, which is 7.3% lower than
that of undergraduates, and the job-to-job transition rate of postgraduates
is 1.78%, which is 8.4% lower than that of undergraduates. Thus, postgrad-
uates are less mobile (lower probabilities of job separation, finding a job, and
transitioning to another job) than undergraduates, indicating that workers
with more specific capital have lower outside options.
Table 6: Unemployment Rates and Monthly Worker Flows
Education Postgrad. Undergrad.
Unemployment rate 2.05% 2.90%
Job separation rate 0.46% 0.69%
Job finding rate 24.5% 26.3%
Job-to-job transition rate 1.78% 1.93%
Job-to-job transition rate uses Monthly CPS 1994-2014. Other variables use
Monthly CPS 1979–2014.
4 The Contracting Model of Asymmetric In-
formation
In this section, I develop an equilibrium search model with long-term con-
tracts, imperfect monitoring of worker effort, and accumulation of specific
human capital. I use it to evaluate the impact of specific capital on wage
cyclicality by education.12 In the model, the amount of specific capital is
12Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) type search models have been used extensively to
model long-term relationships between workers and firms. These models typically assume
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equal to the productivity gap between trainees (new hires) and skilled work-
ers. Trainees obtain specific capital through a period of job adaptation.
I assume risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms, which make long-term
contracts optimal.13 Imperfect monitoring creates a moral hazard problem
that requires firms to pay efficiency wages. Job search is directed, and the
equilibrium is block-recursive, such that individuals’ optimal decisions and
optimal contracts are independent of the distribution of workers.
4.1 The Environment
Time is discrete, indexed by t, and continues forever. Workers are charac-
terized in terms of their education: either noncollege (NC), undergraduate
(BA), or postgraduate (PG). Workers in each education group possess a cer-
tain amount of general human capital, denoted by h ∈ {hNC , hBA, hPG}. I
follow the standard approach in search and matching literature by assuming
that a firm is a single-worker production unit. Workers are initially unskilled
in matches. Let s ∈ {0, 1} denotes a worker’s level of specific capital in the
match, where s = 1 represents a worker possessing specific capital and s = 0
represents a trainee (new hire) without specific capital. Trainees obtain spe-
cific capital through a period of job adaptation. In each period, a trainee
may upgrade to a skilled worker with probability φh. Then 1/φh yields the
average duration of job adaptation. I let τh measures the extent of the pro-
ductivity gap between trainees and skilled workers. Note that φh and τh
depend on the education level h.
Aggregate productivity zt evolves as a first-order Markov chain with tran-
sition probabilities π (zt+1|zt). In aggregate state z, a match between a firm
continual Nash wage bargaining, which would impose transmission of productivity shocks
to wages by construction. Besides, as workers are usually risk-neutral in these models,
they do not care about wage insurance. Allowing risk-aversion will make these models as
complicated as mine.
13This assumption is based on the arguments that entrepreneurs are less risk-averse
than workers, and their risk can be insured through better access to asset markets.
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and a worker of education h produces
yh (s, z) = hz − τh (1− s)
In other words, when the worker is skilled s = 1, the output from the match
is hz, whereas a trainee produces hz − τh.
Workers are risk-averse. They are endowed with one unit of labour each
period, which they supply inelastically to the firms for a wage wt. There
are no asset markets or storage technology, and so the worker’s consumption
each period equals his wage.14 Workers also choose the level of effort et to
avoid job separation.
Assumption 1. The level of effort et equals the probability that the job con-
tinues to exist next period.
With probability 1− et, the worker becomes unemployed. This captures
the idea that a negligent worker might lose a client or break the machine and
cause the job to disappear. Preferences of the worker are
E
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
w1−γt − 1
1− γ
− c (et)
]
where he has constant relative risk aversion preference over consumption,
and the effort cost function c (.) is differentiable, increasing, strictly convex,
and satisfies standard Inada conditions so that effort is interior. Unemployed
workers receive flow value of unemployment bh.
In the beginning of each match, a risk-neutral firm offers a long-term con-
tract to a risk-averse worker. The contract specifies wages and recommended
14A search model combing saving, long-term contracts is very complicated in a business
cycle setting, because job search depends on wealth. In the setting of wage posting, it
requires firms to post jobs depending on wealth. But this is an interesting extension, and
I will explore it in future research. The point I wish to emphasize in this paper is that
workers need less social insurance if there is more firm insurance. Then allowing them to
save will make them need even less social insurance.
19
effort for all continuation histories. Let xτ = (sτ , zτ ) be the state of the
match at period τ . History up to period τ is denoted by xτ = (x1, . . . , xτ ).
Then the contract is a function
σ = {wτ (xτ ) , eτ (xτ )} for all xτ
where wτ is the wage and eτ is the recommended effort.
The optimal contract depends crucially on the observability of the effort
level. If effort were observable, because of the difference in risk aversion
between firms and workers, the problem would be purely one of efficient risk
sharing in which firms would bear all the risk, offer constant wages, and
prescribe constant effort (Azariadis, 1975).
Assumption 2. The level of effort et is unobserved by firms.
As cost of effort enters negatively in his utility function, the worker might
shirk his effort. Then, firms have to adjust wages to provide incentives. Thus,
the moral hazard problem requires firms to pay efficiency wages.
Contracts can be formulated recursively by introducing an additional
state variable, the promised value V (Spear and Srivastava, 1987), which
is the expected discounted future value that the firm promised to deliver
to the worker from this period onwards. At each state (h, s, z, V ), the firm
chooses
{
w,
{
V hs′z′
}
, e
}
. Here w is the current wage,
{
V hs′z′
}
is the expected
discounted value promised for each realization of aggregate state z′ and skill
type s′ next period, and e is the recommended effort level.
4.2 Effort Choice and Firm Profit
An employed worker optimally chooses effort e prescribed by the contract.
Let Uhz be the value of unemployment for a worker of education level h at
aggregate state z. The incentive-compatibility constraint for a worker of skill
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type s and education level h at aggregate state z is
e ∈ argmax
ê
w1−γ − 1
1− γ
− c (ê) + β
[
êEszV hs′z′ + (1− ê)EzUhz′
]
(3)
where the expected promised value next period
EszV hs′z′ =
EzV h1z′ if s = 1Ez [φhV h1z′ + (1− φh)V h0z′] if s = 0
Here φh is the upgrading probability from a trainee to a skilled worker. Then
the necessary and sufficient condition for e to be the optimal effort is
c′ (e) = β
(
EszV hs′z′ − EzUhz′
)
(4)
Intuitively, effort is chosen to equate the marginal cost of effort with its
marginal benefit. As effort cost function c (.) is increasing and strictly convex,
e increases with the expected promised value next period EszV hs′z′ and is
decreasing in the expected value of unemployment next period EzUhz′ .
I now describe the firm problem in terms of promised value. Consider
the situation faced by a firm that is matched with a worker of skill type s
and education level h. Let Πh (s, z, V ) be the expected discounted profit
for the firm when the aggregate state is z and the worker is offered with a
continuation value V . If the match is separated, the firm is left with zero
profit. Then Πh (s, z, V ) must satisfy the following Bellman equation:
Πh (s, z, V ) = max
w,{V hs′z′},e
hz − τh (1− s)− w + βeEszΠh
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
(5)
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where the expected profit next period
EszΠh
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
=
EzΠh
(
1, z′, V hs′z′
)
if s = 1
Ez
[
φhΠh (1, z′,W1z′) +
(
1− φh
)
Πh (0, z′,W0z′)
]
if s = 0
subject to the promise-keeping constraint and the incentive-compatibility
constraint
V =
w1−γ − 1
1− γ
− c (e) + β
[
eEszV hs′z′ + (1− e)EzUhz′
]
(6)
c′ (e) = β
(
EszV hs′z′ − EzUhz′
)
(7)
The promise-keeping constraint (6) requires that the firm delivers the
promised value V to the worker. By increasing future promises, the firm can
increase the effort level of its worker, and thus, increase the probability that
the match continues. Note that promise-keeping and incentive-compatibility
restrictions may define a set that is not convex. Then the profit function
may not be concave. In this case, the solution to the dynamic programming
problem above can be improved by using lotteries (Christopher Phelan and
Robert M. Townsend, 1991). However, the optimal contract may not involve
the use of lotteries, because convexity of the choice set is a sufficient but
not necessary condition for concavity of the profit function. Indeed, in all
my numerical computations, the profit function turns out to be concave,
making lotteries redundant. Since the objective of this section is to derive
some general properties of the optimal contracts, I will focus on the optimal
program defined above, disregarding the use of lotteries.
4.3 Search Markets and Equilibrium
The meeting process between unemployed workers and vacancies is con-
strained by search frictions. The labour market is organized in a set of queues
indexed by (h, v), which are the required education level and the expected
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discounted value promised to workers in that given queue.
Each firm chooses in which queue they want to open a vacancy with
a posting cost ηh, and each unemployed worker chooses where to queue.
Each sub-market is characterized by its tightness represented by θ, which is
the ratio of the number of vacancies to the number of unemployed workers
in this sub-market. The tightness captures the fact that a high ratio of
vacancies to workers will make it harder for firms to hire. In a directed
search model like the one presented here, the tightness is queue specific. I
use a standard matching function that in queue v, a vacancy is filled with
probability q (θ) = θα−1, and a worker matches with probability µ (θ) = θα.
Then
µ (θ) = q (θ)
α
α−1 (8)
Here 0 < α < 1. In principle, different sub-markets could co-exist at the
same time, but this does not happen in equilibrium. Anticipating such an
outcome, the equilibrium definition specifies the labour market as a single
tightness and promised value pair
(
θhz ,EzV h0z′
)
for each aggregate productivity
z and education level h. Appendix C.1 shows this result.
A competitive search equilibrium is defined along the lines of Moen (1997).
Definition 1. A competitive search equilibrium consists of: for each (z, h), a
value for unemployment Uhz and a sub-market with tightness θ
h
z and promised
value EzV h0z′ , such that
1. Search offers zero profit for a firm, i.e. the free entry condition equalizes
the costs of posting a vacancy with the expected discounted profit
βq
(
θhz
)
· EzΠh
(
0, z′, V h0z′
)
− ηh = 0 (9)
where ηh is the vacancy posting cost, and q
(
θhz
)
is the probability of
filling a vacancy. As the worker is initially untrained, EzΠh
(
0, z′, V h0z′
)
is the firm’s expected profit when matched with a trainee in the begin-
ning of the match.
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(a) No Pareto improving sub-market is possible, i.e. there does not
exist a sub-market
(
θ̂hz ,EzV̂ h0z′
)
, s.t.
µ
(
θ̂hz
)
Ez
(
V̂ h0z′ − Uhz′
)
> µ
(
θhz
)
Ez
(
V h0z′ − Uhz′
)
(10)
βq
(
θ̂hz
)
· EzΠh
(
0, z′, V̂ h0z′
)
> ηh (11)
(b) The value for unemployment Uhz is consistent:
Uhz =
(
bh
)1−γ − 1
1− γ
+ βEz
{
µ
(
θhz
)
V h0z′ +
[
1− µ
(
θhz
)]
Uhz′
}
(12)
4.4 Contract Characterization
I now proceed to derive some general properties of the optimal contract given
that firms face the trade-off between insurance and incentives.
Lemma 1. The pareto frontier Πh (s, z, V ) increases with the level of aggre-
gate productivity z.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Proposition 1. Wages and expected firm profit have the following relation-
ship
wγs′z′ − w
γ
sz =
βEszΠh
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
ec′′ (e)
(13)
where EszΠh
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
is the expected firm profit next period, wsz is the
current wage, and ws′z′ is the wage next period.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that wage changes will have the
same sign as expected firm profit. When EszΠh
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
= 0, the wage
will not change ws′z′ = wsz. Since effort cost function is strictly convex, i.e.
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c′′ (e) > 0, when EszΠh
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
> 0, wγs′z′ > w
γ
sz, and thus, ws′z′ > wsz
by concavity.
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 provide a clear prediction for how wage
changes are dependent on aggregate productivity. Whenever the firm ex-
pects positive (negative) profits due to aggregate productivity increases (de-
creases), it will be optimal to increase (decrease) the wage. This implies that
wage changes track aggregate productivity shocks.
4.5 Specific Capital, Effort Level and Wage Smoothing
In this section, I show that the extent of wage smoothing is affected by the
level of specific capital.
Lemma 2. The expected firm profit from hiring a trainee Πh (0, z, V ) de-
creases with specific human capital.
Proof. See Appendix C.4.
From Lemma 2, more specific capital reduces a firm’s incentive to post
vacancies, leading to a decrease in the job finding rate in each sub-market,
thereby reducing the value of a worker’s outside options.
Proposition 2. The effort level of skilled workers increases with specific
human capital.
Proof. See Appendix C.5.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that, in leaving their current jobs,
skilled workers have to build up specific human capital again, so they have
strong incentives to keep their jobs longer. These incentives increase with
the level of specific capital, as more specific capital reduces the value of a
worker’s outside options in all aggregate states. Thus, skilled workers with
more specific capital will make a greater effort to avoid job separation.
Proposition 3 needs the following sufficient condition:
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Assumption 3. The marginal cost of effort is convex. In other words, the
second derivative of the effort cost function, c′′ (e), increases with the level of
effort.
Proposition 3. Given Assumption 3, wage smoothing of skilled workers
increases with specific human capital.
Proof. The response of the effort level to increased incentives is
de
dβEz
(
V h1z′ − Uhz′
) = d (c′)−1 [βEz (Vz′ − Uz′)]
dβEz
(
V h1z′ − Uhz′
) = de
dc′ (e)
=
1
c′′ (e)
Then, we can rewrite the relationship between wage changes of skilled workers
and the expected firm profit (Equation 13) as
e× (wγ1z′ − w
γ
1z) =
de
dβEz
(
V h1z′ − Uhz′
) × βEzΠh (1, z′, V h1z′) (14)
The first term on the left-hand side of Equation (14) is the effort level,
which equals the job continuation probability. From Proposition 2, skilled
workers with more specific capital have higher levels of effort, and their jobs
are less likely to break down, and thus, they will value more about firms’
promises of future wage changes. As wage changes becomes more effective
in motivating workers, firms do not need to give workers a lot of incentives.
Intuitively, as skilled workers with more specific capital are less likely to leave
their current jobs, firms do not have to increase wages to keep them in booms.
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (14) is the response of
e to increased incentives. According to Assumption 3, as the level of effort
increases, this response becomes smaller, and thus, it becomes increasingly
costly for firms to provide incentives for worker effort. More specific capital
increases the effort level of skilled workers, thereby increasing marginal cost
of providing incentives for firms.
Firms face the trade-off between insurance and incentives. Given the
same amount of expected profit, as more specific capital increases both the
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effectiveness and the marginal cost of providing incentives, it becomes op-
timal for firms to provide more insurance rather than more incentives, i.e.
smaller wage changes caused by changes in aggregate productivity. There-
fore, wage smoothing of skilled workers increases with the level of specific
capital.
5 Estimation
To be able to use the model for quantifying the effect of specific capital
on wage cyclicality, some of the model parameters are calibrated or fixed
at externally estimated values, while others are directly estimated. I begin
by describing fixed and externally estimated parameters and then turn to
parameters estimated by the simulated method of moments.
5.1 Fixed and Externally Estimated Parameters
The parameter values that are fixed or externally estimated are listed in Table
7. A period in the model is 1 month. The discount factor is consistent with
an annual real interest rate of 5%. I normalize the amount of general skills for
undergraduates hBA = 1. For the elasticity of the matching function, I draw
from the evidence reported in Shimer (2005) and accordingly set α = 0.28.
The probability of being upgraded from a trainee to a skilled worker φ is
calculated as the inverse of the empirical adaptation duration in Table 4
using MCSUI.15
15Weeks are transformed to months by multiplying 4.33, so that
φPG = 4.33/58.52 = 0.07, φBA = 4.33/29.17 = 0.15, φNC = 4.33/22.46 = 0.19
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Table 7: Exogenous Parameter Values
Description Param. Value Source
discount factor β .996
general skill for BA hBA 1 Normalization
matching function elasticity α .28 Shimer (2005)
upgrading probability for a trainee
Postgraduates φPG .07 MCSUI
Undergraduates φBA .15 MCSUI
Noncollege workers φNC .19 MCSUI
5.2 Model Specification
Given the parameters above, I estimate the model using the simulated method
of moments and a parametrized model. I present the specification I use in
this section. The aggregate productivity follows an AR(1) in logs, such that
lnzt = ρzlnzt−1 + vzt where vzt ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
(15)
The worker effort function is
c (e) = c0
[
(1− e)−c1 − 1
]
(16)
such that c (0) = 0, lim
e→1
c (e) = ∞, c′ (.) > 0, c′′ (.) > 0, c′′′ (.) > 0.16 I
assume the vacancy posting cost and the flow value of unemployment are
proportional to the amount of general skills to rule out different profitability
(Pissarides, 2000)
ηh = η ∗ h (17)
bh = b ∗ h (18)
16c′ (e) = c0c1 (1− e)−c1−1 , c′ (0) = c0c1, lim
e→1
c′ (e) = ∞. To deal with the corner
solutions, I set effort to 0 if c′ (0) < c0c1, and effort can never be 1 as the cost is infinite.
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where b can be interpreted as the unemployment insurance replacement rate.
I relax these proportionality assumptions in Section D.2 and D.3.
These specifications leave me with the following 12 parameters to esti-
mate:
{ρz, σz, η, b, c0, c1, γ, τPG, τBA, τNC , hPG, hNC}
I perform my estimations using the simulated method of moments. The ob-
jective function is minimized over all parameters. The parameters of the ag-
gregate productivity shock, ρz and σz are identified by the standard deviation
and auto-correlation of log GDP. The amount of general skills {hPG, hNC}
are pinned down by the median postgraduate wage premium and the median
undergraduate-noncollege wage premium. For the initial productivity gaps
between trainees and skilled workers {τPG, τBA, τNC}, I target the empirical
data from DWS on percent losses in wages after job displacement in Table 5.
The vacancy cost η affects the meeting rate through firm’s free entry
condition (9). The unemployment insurance replacement rate b affects the
value of unemployment, and thus, affects the probabilities of starting a job,
since individuals without jobs will choose where to apply based on present
value. Thus, job finding probabilities by education pin down η and b. The
parameters of the effort cost function c0 and c1 affect the average rate at
which workers lose their jobs. They are pinned down by job separation rates
by education. I construct these labour turnover rates from the monthly Cur-
rent Population Survey 1979-2014. As GDP is only provided on a quarterly
frequency, I take the quarterly average for all monthly series. Then, I log
and HP filter the data with smoothing parameter 105 to produce business
cycle statistics.17
The parameter of risk aversion γ controls how quickly changes in ag-
gregate productivity are transmitted into wage changes. I target it at the
elasticity of median wages with respect to GDP for undergraduates. Please
note that the elasticity of median wages for postgraduates and noncollege
17The smoothing parameter is suggested by Shimer (2005).
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workers are not targeted. I leave them as model outcomes and show that the
model is successfully able to match the non-targeted moments.
5.3 Estimation Results
Estimation is performed using the simulated method of moments. Since
the model is strongly parametrized, I choose the weighting matrix to reflect
how informative each moment should be about the parameters of interest.
The default weight is chosen to be the inverse of the level to minimize a
distance in relative deviation. The computation of standard errors is based
on the pseudo-likelihood estimator presented in Chernozhukov and Hong
(2003). Using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) rejection sampling, I
can perform the estimation without having to compute derivatives and still
obtain standard errors on the parameters.
The parameter estimates are displayed in Table 8. The monthly aggregate
productivity shock has a persistence of 0.985. The standard deviation of the
shock to the aggregate productivity is 0.0052. The vacancy posting cost is
7.324. The unemployment insurance replacement rate is 0.557. The level
and the curvature of effort cost are 0.157 and 0.096 respectively. The risk
aversion parameter is 1.116. The initial productivity gap for undergraduates
is 0.173, which is 35% of that for postgraduates. The initial productivity
gap for noncollege workers is 0.137. The amount of general human capital
for noncollege workers is 0.682 and for postgraduates is 1.222.
The fitted moments in the data and their model simulations are shown
in the columns “Data” and “Baseline” of Table 9. The model fits the
moments quite well. One success of the model is that it can capture the
turnover rates between postgraduates and undergraduates: undergraduates
have higher probabilities both in job finding and job separation compared
to postgraduates, and the relative differences are generally accurate. As the
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Table 8: Parameter Estimates
Parameters Value s.e.
Persistence of aggregate productivity ρz .985 .0056
Std. of shock to aggregate productivity σz .0052 .0019
Vacancy posting cost η 7.324 2.022
Unemployment insurance replacement rate b .557 .077
Level of effort cost c0 .157 .048
Curvature of effort cost c1 .096 .024
Risk aversion γ 1.116 .028
Initial productivity gap
Postgraduate τPG .498 .065
Undergraduate τBA .173 .051
Noncollege τNC .137 .053
Formal human capital
Postgraduate hPG 1.222 .041
Noncollege hNC .682 .061
The computation of standard errors is based on the pseudo-likelihood esti-
mator presented in Chernozhukov and Hong (2003).
job separation rate equals 1 minus the average level of effort, postgraduates
maintain a higher level of effort in their current job than undergraduates do.
The job separation rate for noncollege workers is lower than its counterpart
in the US. This is because, in this model, job separation is only a result of
lack of worker effort. On the one hand, this suggests that the estimation
might benefit from making the parameters for the effort cost function het-
erogeneous across education levels. On the other hand, there are many other
factors that might lead to higher job separation for this group, and thus,
imposing an exogenous job separation rate would move the fit in the right
direction.
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Table 9: Model Fit
Moments Data Baseline
Postgraduates
Job separation rate .005 .005
Job finding rate .245 .248
Percent wage losses after displacement -.178 -.176
Undergraduates
Job separation rate .007 .009
Job finding rate .263 .263
Percent wage losses after displacement -.086 -.089
Elasticity of median wage to GDP .58 .58
Noncollege workers
Job separation rate .016 .009
Job finding rate .272 .265
Percent wage losses after displacement -.086 -.086
Common moments
Median postgraduate wage premium 1.23 1.219
Median undergraduate wage premium 1.47 1.466
std [GDP ] .024 .024
autocorr [GDP ] .954 .955
6 Analysis
6.1 Cyclical Properties of Wages and Wage Premium
Table 10 shows the cyclicality of wages and wage premium in the data and
their model simulations. Please note only the wage cyclicality for undergrad-
uates is targeted in the estimation; the wage cyclicalities for postgraduates
and noncollege workers are not targeted.
Overall, the model correctly captures the cyclicality of wages and wage
premium: The undergraduate wage is more pro-cyclical than the postgradu-
ate wage, and is about the same as the noncollege wage. The postgraduate
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Table 10: Cyclicality of Wages and Wage Premium
Moments Type Data Baseline
Elasticity of median wage to GDP
Postgraduates Non-targeted .34 .322
Undergraduates Targeted .58 .58
Noncollege workers Non-targeted .57 .574
Elasticity of median wage premium to GDP
Postgraduate wage premium (wPG/wBA) Non-targeted -.24 -.258
Undergrad. wage premium (wBA/wNC) Non-targeted .01 .006
Notes: Non-targeted moments are not targeted in the estimation.
wage premium is counter-cyclical; the undergraduate wage premium is acycli-
cal. The elasticity of median postgraduate wage premium to GDP is -0.258,
and the elasticity of undergraduate wage premium is 0.006, which are about
the same size as the data.
Figure 2 plots the GDP and wages simulated from the model. The dotted
line is the GDP, the solid line is the postgraduate wage, and the dashed line is
the undergraduate wage. As each series is logged and demeaned, it shows the
percentage deviation from the mean. It shows that both the postgraduate
wage and the undergraduate wage are pro-cyclical, but the postgraduate wage
fluctuates less than the undergraduate wage. Therefore, the model picks up
the fact that the postgraduate wage is smoother than the undergraduate
wage over the business cycle.18
6.2 Effect of Specific Capital on Wage Cyclicality
To examine the importance of specific capital on wage cyclicality, I run a
counterfactual simulation where postgraduates have the same low level of
specific capital as undergraduates: upgrade probability φ is increased from
18Appendix D evaluates the plausibility of other potential explanations for the counter-
cyclical postgraduate wage premium.
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Figure 2: Demeaned Log GDP and Log Wages by Education
0.07 to 0.15, and the initial productivity gap τ is reduced from 0.498 to 0.173.
I report the simulation results in the column “Low Capital” of Table 11.
The first row of column “Low Capital” shows that when postgraduates
have lower specific capital, the job separation rate increases to 0.01 from
0.005 in the baseline. As there is less to lose if they move to a new job,
they make a lower level of effort to keep their jobs. A decrease in the average
duration of job adaptation and the initial productivity gap increase the value
of a new job. Consequently, firms have a greater incentive to post vacancies.
In the second row of “Low Capital”, the job finding rate of the postgraduates
increases to 0.265 from 0.248 in the baseline. Hence, when holding the same
level of specific capital, postgraduates and undergraduates have the same
level of labour market turnover rates.
The most important changes are to wage cyclicality. The 4th row of
“Low Capital” shows that when postgraduates have lower costs, the wage
elasticity to GDP increases 86% from 0.322 to 0.599, indicating that the
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Table 11: Low Level of Specific Capital for Postgraduates
Moments Baseline Low Capital
Postgraduates
Job separation rate .005 .010
Job finding rate .248 .265
Percent wage losses after displacement -.176 -.083
Elasticity of median wage to GDP .322 .599
Undergraduates
Job separation rate .009 .009
Job finding rate .263 .263
Percent wage losses after displacement -.089 -.089
Elasticity of median wage to GDP .58 .58
Postgraduate wage premium (wPG/wBA)
Median 1.219 1.222
Elasticity to GDP -.258 .018
Baseline: baseline calibration; Low Capital: Postgraduates have the same low level
of specific capital as undergraduates.
postgraduate wage fluctuates more over the business cycle and is as cyclical
as the undergraduate wage. In the last row of “Low Capital”, the elasticity
of postgraduate wage premium to GDP changes from -0.258 to 0.018, i.e.
the postgraduate wage premium changes from counter-cyclical to acyclical.
So once holding the level of specific capital equal, the model generates same
wage cyclicality across education groups. This result shows that specific
capital explains the difference in the wage cyclicality between postgraduates
and undergraduates.
Figure 3 compares log median wages with different levels of specific cap-
ital. The solid line is the log median wage of postgraduates in the baseline
simulation, the dashed line is the log median wage of postgraduates in the
“Low Capital” simulation, and the dotted line is the log median wage of un-
dergraduates in the baseline. First, in comparing educations levels, postgrad-
uate wages are higher than undergraduate wages. When I compare within
postgraduate wages, the postgraduate wage in the baseline is smoother than
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that in the “Low Capital” simulation, which is also the result of Proposi-
tion 3. The postgraduate wage in the “Low Capital” simulation fluctuates
as much as the undergraduate wage in the baseline. Interestingly, in Figure
3, the postgraduate wage in the “Low Capital” simulation is higher than
that in the baseline simulation. Thus, a low level of specific capital shifts
the postgraduate wage up. In the penultimate row of column “Low Capital”
of Table 9, the postgraduate wage premium increases to 1.222 from 1.219
in the baseline. There, when I hold the level of specific capital equal, the
postgraduate wage premium increases. As postgraduates have more specific
capital than undergraduates, they accept relatively low wages, leading to a
smaller wage premium.
Figure 3: Effect of Specific Capital on Wage Cyclicality
Figure 5 in Appendix C.6 plots the wage-tenure profiles by education.
It shows that the gap between the starting wage of postgraduates and their
average wage is greater than that of undergraduates, but the subsequent wage
growth of postgraduates is faster. This result extends the specific human
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capital hypothesis in Chapman and Tan (1980) – that the starting wage and
the rate of wage growth are negatively related – to the context of education
wage gaps.
7 Policy Evaluation
In this section, I use the model to test whether the wage insurance provided
by firms against aggregate shocks (firm insurance) will be crowded out by
social insurance. I evaluate a more generous unemployment insurance policy
– the unemployment insurance replacement rate is increased by 20%. Such
policy provides better social insurance when workers are unemployed, which
raises the value of worker’s outside options. Then, workers are more likely to
shirk their effort, and thus, firms have a greater incentive to adjust wages.
I report the simulation results in the column “High UI” of Table 12.
First, understanding that the government is providing more insurance, firms
choose to pass on more of the aggregate shocks to their workers. The result
is an increase in the wage cyclicality: the wage elasticity to GDP increases
by 12% for postgraduates, 10% for undergraduates, and 9% for noncollege
workers. Thus, unemployment insurance crowds out firm insurance, but to
a less extent for lower-educated workers.
In Table 12, I also compute the worker’s willingness to pay for such a
policy for each education group. To define the willingness to pay, I write the
lifetime expected utility of an individual as
EUd = E
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
w1−γdt − 1
1− γ
− c (edt)
]
where the subscript d refers to the baseline economy (d = 1) or an alter-
native more generous economy (d = 2). Now define π as the proportion of
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Table 12: Raise UI replacement rate
Moments Baseline High UI % change
Postgraduates
Median wage 1.22 1.22 0%
Elasticity of median wage to GDP .322 .36 12%
Willingness to pay π .42%
Undergraduates
Median wage 1 1 0%
Elasticity of median wage to GDP .58 .638 10%
Willingness to pay π .72%
Noncollege workers
Median wage .68 .68 0%
Elasticity of median wage to GDP .574 .623 9%
Willingness to pay π .74%
Baseline: baseline calibration; High UI: 20% increase in the unemployment insur-
ance replacement rate; “% change”: percentage change in values between “High
UI” and “Baseline”.
consumption an individual is willing to pay to be indifferent between envi-
ronment d = 2 and d = 1. This is implicitly defined by
EU1 = EU2|π ≡ E
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
((1− π)w2t)1−γ − 1
1− γ
− c (e2t)
}
π =1−
[
E0U1 + A+B
E0U2 + A+B
] 1
1−γ
where A = 1
(1−γ)(1−β) and B = E
∑∞
t=0 β
tc (e2t).
For a 20% increase in the UI replacement rate, postgraduates are willing
to pay 0.4% of their consumption, whereas undergraduates and noncollege
workers are willing to pay 0.7% of their consumption. Hence, lower-educated
workers have a higher welfare gain than postgraduates from such a policy,
which supports the argument for a regressive UI replacement rate schedule,
i.e. that the unemployment insurance replacement rate should be lower for
postgraduates.
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8 Conclusion
I document a new result: in the US, the postgraduate wage premium is
counter-cyclical — postgraduates have smaller cyclical wage variation than
undergraduates. I further document that the difference in wage cyclicality
between postgraduates and undergraduates is significant for workers with a
long job tenure, but not for new hires. As workers’ job tenure is the generally
used proxy for specific human capital, I argue that this phenomenon occurs
because postgraduates accumulate more specific capital than undergradu-
ates. I provide robust empirical evidence that is consistent with the theory:
1) Postgraduates need more time to adapt to new jobs than undergraduates;
2) Postgraduates suffer larger wage losses from job displacement.
To understand how specific capital affects labour turnover and wage cycli-
cality, I develop an equilibrium search model with long-term contracts and
imperfect monitoring of worker effort. Imperfect monitoring creates a moral
hazard problem that requires firms to pay efficiency wages. The theoretical
implication of the model is that more specific capital leads to lower mobility,
thereby increasing both the effectiveness and the marginal cost of providing
incentives for worker effort. As firms face the trade-off between insurance
and incentives, it is optimal for them to provide more insurance rather than
more incentives. Therefore, more specific capital leads to smoother wages.
I quantify the level of specific human capital by education in the data
and use it to parameterize my model. The model captures differences in
wage cyclicality and labour turnover between education groups, indicating
that specific capital is an important driving force. The paper implies that
lower educated workers, and even undergraduates, are unlikely to receive
much insurance from firms, hence increasing the demand for social insurance
among this group. I analyze the impact of an increase in the unemployment
insurance replacement rate. I find such a policy crowds out wage insurance
provided by firms, but the effect is smaller for lower educated workers. Lower
educated workers have a higher welfare gain from such a policy than post-
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graduates, which supports the argument for a lower UI replacement rate for
postgraduates.
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A Additional Details on Data
A.1 Current Population Survey (CPS)
The CPS is designed to be representative of the civilian non-institutional
population. The survey interviews about 60,000 households at a monthly
frequency on a short rotating basis. I merge monthly CPS data to create a
short panel. Specifically, I use the code by Robert Shimer19, combined with
monthly CPS files downloaded from NBER20. See Shimer (2012) for a further
discussion of the issues involved in linking individuals across months in the
monthly CPS files. The short panel allows me to estimate job separation rate
and job finding rate from 1979-2014. Since the introduction of dependent
interviewing techniques with the 1994 redesign of the CPS, the survey asks
whether an employed worker works for the same employer as last month. I
use this fact to estimate the job-to-job transition rate from 1994–2014. I use
the provided monthly CPS weight.
In addition to the monthly CPS, in march every year the CPS fields
the Annual Social and Economic supplement (March CPS), which collects
detailed demographic data for each household member and labor force and
income information for each household member age 15 or older. I download
the March CPS data from https://cps.ipums.org/cps/, which are available
at the state level starting in 1976. Labor force and income information
correspond to the previous year. I use the March supplement weights to
produce my estimates on wage cyclicality.
The Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) is another supplement to the CPS
administered in the January or February of every even year. The DWS
identifies displaced workers who have been separated from their employers
due to (i) insufficient demand for the worker’s services, (ii) the worker’s
position being abolished, or (iii) the worker’s plant closing — reasons which
19https://sites.google.com/site/robertshimer/research/flows
20http://www.nber.org/data/cps basic.html
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have been taken by the literature to instrument for “exogenous” layoffs. The
DWS inherits the large sample size and representative structure of the CPS
and also records information on earnings on both the displaced and current
job.
A.2 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
The PSID is a longitudinal study of US households and individuals. The
original 1968 sample was drawn from two independent sub-samples: an over-
sample of roughly 2000 poor families selected from the Survey of Economic
Opportunities (SEO), and a nationally representative sample of roughly 3000
families designed by the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of
Michigan. In 1997, the SEO sample was reduced by one-half. In 1990, PSID
added 2000 Latino households, including families originally from Mexico,
Puerto Rico, and Cuba. While this sample (the so-called “Latino sample”)
did represent three major groups of immigrants, it missed out on the full
range of post-1968 immigrants, Asians in particular. Because of this crucial
shortcoming, and a lack of sufficient funding, the Latino sample was dropped
after 1995. A sample of 441 immigrant families, including Asians, was added
in 1997 (the so-called “Immigrant sample”).
Since 1968, the PSID has interviewed individuals from families in the
initial samples. Adults have been followed as they have grown older, and
children have been observed as they have advanced into adulthood, forming
family units of their own (the “split-offs”). Survey waves are annual from
1968 to 1997, and biennial since then. Although the PSID provides a wide
variety of information about all individuals in the family unit, the greatest
level of detail is ascertained for the primary adult in the family unit, i.e.,
the head21. In the PSID all the questions are retrospective, i.e., variables in
21The head of the family unit (FU) must be at least 16 years old, and the person with
the most financial responsibility in the FU. If this person is female and she has a husband
in the FU, then he is designated as head. If she has a boyfriend with whom she has been
living for at least one year, then he is head. However, if she has 1) a husband or a boyfriend
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survey-year t refer to calendar year t − 1. The interview is usually conducted
around March.
I base my empirical analysis on the SRC sample. I use all the yearly
surveys from 1985–1996 and the biennial surveys from 1997-2015. I start in
1985 because the variable on highest degree received is available only since
198522. I restrict the sample to male heads aged 26 to 64 who were not self-
employed, and I only use the first spell I observe someone as a head. Wages
are annual hourly wages (annual labour earnings divided by annual hours).
Nominal wages are deflated by the Consumer Price Index. The base year is
2000. I also restrict the sample to hourly wage less than or equal to $100.
Workers who worked less than 520 hours per year or whose hourly wage rate
was below $1 (in 2000 dollars) or less than half of the corresponding federal
minimum wage in that year are viewed as non-employed. I create consistent
measure of age: I determine the age in the first year the respondent was a
head, and then increment age by 1 for each subsequent year the respondent
was a head.
A.3 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequalities (MCSUI)
The MCSUI was collected in four large US cities (Los Angeles, Boston, De-
troit and Atlanta) between 1992 and 1994. It aims to understand why high
rates of joblessness have persisted among minorities living in America’s cen-
tral cities. One important aspect of the study was the contacting of more
than 3000 employers to ask detailed questions about their hiring practices.
who is incapacitated and unable to fulfill the functions of head, 2) a boyfriend who has
been living in the FU for less than a year, 3) no husband/boyfriend, then the FU will have
a female head. A new head is selected if last year’s head moved out of the household unit,
died or became incapacitated, or if a single female head has gotten married. Also, if the
family is a split-off family (hence a new family unit in the sample), then a new head is
chosen.
22Although individual’s years of education is available before 1985, almost no one has
more than 16 years of education before 1983 in my sample, which is not useful for the
analysis of postgraduates.
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Even though the intent of the study was to understand racial discrimination
in hiring, the exhaustive information about the recruitment process makes
this study valuable for broader purposes. The sampling procedure and the
provided weights intend to represent employees who worked in the 4 cities in
1992. A subsection of the survey asked employers about their most recently
hired worker. One of the questions is “How many weeks does it take the
typical employee in this position to become fully competent in it?” I use it
to analyze the adaptation duration by education in this paper.
B Additional Details on Empirical Facts
B.1 Robustness Check of Regression (1)
GDP as an Indicator of the Business Cycle
Instead of the unemployment rate, I use log real GDP as an indicator of the
business cycle and run the following regression
lnWit = θPGit + α ln GDPt + γPGit × ln GDPt +Xitβ + εit
α indicates the relation between the undergraduate wage and GDP. For in-
stance, a positive estimate of α would imply that the average real wage of
undergraduates increases when GDP rises, i.e. the undergraduate wage is
pro-cyclical. The coefficients γ captures the difference between the cycli-
cality of the postgraduate wage and the undergraduate wage, and α + γ
indicates the cyclicality of the postgraduate wage. A negative estimate of
γ would indicate a counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium — the pre-
mium decreases when GDP rises. The estimates are in column (1) of Table
13. It shows that when real GDP increases by 1%, the postgraduate wage
increases by 0.403% and the undergraduate wage increases by 0.988%, con-
firming the finding that the postgraduate wage is less pro-cyclical than the
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undergraduate wage.
Cubic Detrending, Median Regression, and Age Groups
In column (2) of Table 13, I detrend the aggregate unemployment rate using
a cubic time trend and find that when the unemployment rate goes up by
1 percentage point, postgraduates face a 0.64% increase in their real wage
relative to that of undergraduates. In column (3), I run a median regression
and find that when the unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage point,
the median wage of postgraduates increases by 0.74% relative to that of un-
dergraduates. In column (4) and (5), I cut the baseline sample into 2 age
groups. I find that when the unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage
point, postgraduates aged 26-40 face a 0.86% wage increase relative to un-
dergraduates in the same age group, and postgraduates aged 41-64 face a
0.70% relative wage increase. So having a postgraduate degree significantly
reduces wage cyclicality for both age groups.
Job Stayers and Heckman Selection Model
A typical selection bias problem is that undergraduates are more likely to be
unemployed than postgraduates in recessions, so the average undergraduate
wage increases mechanically relative to the average postgraduate wage. To
eliminate such systematic selection, I run the regression (1) with only job
stayers – workers who stayed in the same job last year, had no stretch of
looking for work, and worked for 52 weeks. Column (6) of Table 13 shows
that the coefficient γ on PGit × Ut shrinks slightly to 0.0069 (s.e. 0.0022).
Therefore, job separation can only explain a small amount of the counter-
cyclical postgraduate premium.
Besides, I use a maximum likelihood version of Heckman (1979) selection
model. This model estimates a wage equation jointly with probit choice
equation that determines whether a worker is employed. The model is written
as follows:
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Table 13: Robustness – Regression of Real Hourly Wage on Degree Interac-
tion
(1)
lnWage ln GDP
lnGDP (α) .988
(.074)
PG× lnGDP (γ) -.584
(.119)
α + γ .403
(.094)
(2) (3) (4)
lnWage Cubic Detrend Median 26˜40
URATE (α) -.0105 -.0099 -.0157
(.0011) (.0013) (.0016)
PG× URATE (γ) .0064 .0074 .0086
(.0017) (.0021) (.0029)
α + γ -.0041 -.0026 -.0071
(.0014) (.0017) (.0024)
(5) (6) (7)
lnWage 41˜64 Job Stayers Heckman
URATE (α) -.0094 -.0106 -.0121
(0019) (.0013) (.0012)
PG× URATE (γ) .0070 .0069 .0084
(.0029) (.0022) (.0021)
α + γ -.0023 -.0037 -.0037
(.0023) (.0018) (.0017)
(1) Use Log real GDP as an indicator of the business cycle; (2) Unemployment
rate is detrended by a cubic trend; (3) Median regression; (4) Aged 26˜40;
(5) Aged 41˜64; (6) Workers had only 1 employer, no stretch of looking for
work, and worked for 52 weeks; (7) Heckman selection model with first-stage
employment choice. Controls: postgraduate degree, state, race, and marriage
dummies, a cubic age trend and a quartic time trend.
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lnWit =θPGit + αUt + γPGit × Ut +Xitβ + εit,
observed iff Pit = 1,
where P ∗it =δPGit + δUt + ηPGit × Ut + Zitβ0 + ωit,
Pit =
1 if P ∗it ≥ 00 if P ∗it < 0
Here P ∗it is the latent index of a probit employment equation that determines
whether worker i is employed at time t. Zit is a vector of individual-specific
regressors that affect the probability of employment. Typically, it contains
elements that enter into Xit as well as some additional variables that may
affect labour supply propensity but not worker productivity. The additional
variables are: number of own children in the household, number of own
children under age 5 in the household, and age of youngest own child in
the household. The error terms εit and ωit are assumed to have a bivariate
normal distribution with correlation ρ and respective standard deviations σε
and 1. The latter variance is normalized to one for identification of the probit
choice equation. Column (7) of Table 13 presents the estimates that when
the unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage point, postgraduates face
a 0.84% wage increase relative to undergraduates, which is similar to the
baseline.
B.2 Regressions by Industries and Occupations
Does this phenomenon occur because postgraduates and undergraduates sort
into different industries and occupations that are subject to different cyclical
variation in productivity? To test whether this argument holds, I run the
wage equation at the industry and occupation level. Table 14 presents the
estimates. I find that the postgraduate wage premium is counter-cyclical in
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all major industries and in Managerial, Professional Specialty, Technical, and
Sales occupations (added up to 82% of all college graduates).
Importance of Occupations and Industries
Here I check whether the different wage cyclicality of occupations and indus-
tries are important determinants of the counter-cyclical postgraduate wage
premium. In order for this argument hold, occupations and industries must
be strong predictors of counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium. To test
this condition, I run the following regression
lnWit =
J∑
j=1
(κjIijt + αjIijt × Ut) + γPGit × Ut + θPGit +Xiβ + εit (19)
where Iijt = 1 if worker i locates in industry or occupation j at time t. Iijt
is interacted with the unemployment rate. The interesting question is by
how much coefficient γ shrinks after I control for the interaction between
the unemployment rate and Iijt. The more it shrinks, the more industries
and occupations can explain, in a regression sense, the counter-cyclicality
postgraduate wage premium. Table 15 shows the regression results. Col-
umn (1) shows the baseline without controlling for industries or occupations.
When I control for 2-digit industries (43 categories) in Column (2), the co-
efficient γ on PGit × Ut shrinks slightly from 0.0086 to 0.0078 (s.e. 0.0021).
When I control for 2-digit occupations (60 categories) in Column (3), the
coefficient γ shrinks to 0.0063 (s.e. 0.0021). In Column (4), I include in-
teractions between 2-digit occupations and industries, and the coefficient γ
shrinks to 0.0059 (s.e. 0.0020). In Column (5), I include more dis-aggregated
3-digit industries (237 categories), and the coefficient γ shrinks to 0.0065 (s.e.
0.0020). In Column (6), I include 3-digit occupations (384 categories), and
the coefficient γ shrinks 40% to 0.0052 (s.e. 0.0020).
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Table 14: Wage Regression at the Industry/Occupation Level
lnWage URATE PG× URATE BAI+PGI∑
I BAI+PGI
PGI∑
I PGI
PGI
BAI+PGI
by Industry
Nondurable Mfg. -.0121 .0163 5.95% 4.63% 29.76%
(.0039) (.0026)
Durable Mfg. -.0152 .0126 11.51% 9.69% 32.25%
(.0026) (.0023)
T.C.U -.0080 .0103 7.25% 4.40% 23.23%
(.0036) (.0025)
F.I.R -.0186 .0101 9.54% 7.17% 28.79%
(.0034) (.0025)
Services -.0139 .0082 40.79% 56.72% 53.26%
(.0019) (.0021)
Trade -.0151 .0047 11.79% 5.97% 19.40%
(.0032) (.0026)
Public Admin. -.0018 .0066 8.48% 8.59% 38.78%
(.0026) (.0022)
A.M.C .0005 .0122 4.69% 2.84% 23.15%
(.0047) (.0029)
by Occupation
Managerial -.0125 .0110 29.07% 27.94% 36.81%
(.0019) (.0021)
Professional -.0131 .0087 36.35% 53.56% 56.44%
(.0019) (.0021)
Technical -.0087 .0056 5.48% 4.47% 31.29%
(.0037) (.0025)
Sales -.0121 .0065 11.06% 5.32% 18.44%
(.0034) (.0026)
Service & Admin. -.0105 .0006 9.98% 5.29% 20.30%
(.0029) (.0025)
P.C.R -.0126 .0007 4.13% 1.71% 15.88%
(.0044) (.0031)
O.F.L -.0067 -.0071 3.94% 1.70% 16.53%
(.0049) (.0033)
BAI+PGI∑
I BAI+PGI
: the proportion of Industry/Occupation I among all college grad-
uates (PG+BA).
PGI∑
I PGI
: the proportion of Industry/Occupation I among all postgraduates.
PGI
BAI+PGI
: the ratio of postgraduates to college graduates in Indus-
try/Occupation I. T.C.U: Transportation, Communications and Utilities.
F.I.R: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate. A.M.C: Agriculture, Mining
and Construction. P.C.R: Precision production, Craft and Repair. O.F.L:
Operators, Fabricators and Labourers.
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Table 15: Controlling for interaction between the unemployment rate and
Iijt
lnWage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
URATE -.0124
(.0012)
PG× URATE .0086 .0078 .0063 .0059 .0065 .0052
(.0021) (.0021) (.0021) (.0020) (.0020) (.0020)
2-digit Ind. X
2-digit Occ. X
2-digit Occ.× Ind. X
3-digit Ind. X
3-digit Occ. X
B.3 Change in Log Wages
Figure 4 plots the average annual changes in log wages between booms and
recessions. I use March CPS 1976–2016 and recessions years are 1980-1983,
1990-1992, 2001-2002 and 2008-2010. The figure shows a considerable differ-
ence in wage growth rates between undergraduates and postgraduates. Un-
dergraduates have a larger wage growth rate than postgraduates in booms
and a smaller (even negative) wage growth rate than postgraduates in reces-
sions. The wage growth rates in booms and recessions for postgraduates are
relatively more stable than those for undergraduates.
C Model Appendix
C.1 Unique Search Market
The definition of equilibrium can be collapsed to the problem:
max
θ̂hz ,EzV̂ h0z′
µ
(
θ̂hz
)
Ez
(
V̂ h0z′ − Uhz′
)
(20)
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Figure 4: Change in log wages: Booms versus Recessions
s.t.
βq
(
θ̂hz
)
· EzΠh
(
0, z′, V̂ h0z′
)
− ηh = 0
From the relationship between the probabilities of finding a job and fill-
ing a vacancy (Equation 8), we have the job finding rate in a sub-market(
θ̂hz ,EzV̂ h0z′
)
as follows:
µ
(
θ̂hz
)
=
βEzΠh
(
0, z′, V̂ h0z′
)
ηh

α
1−α
(21)
Substitute it into (20), we have
max
θ̂hz ,EzV̂ h0z′
βEzΠh
(
0, z′, V̂ h0z′
)
ηh

α
1−α
Ez
(
V̂ h0z′ − Uhz′
)
(22)
For any contract delivering a higher value to the worker, the market tight-
ness must be lower for firms to break even in offering such a contract. The
lower market tightness makes the contract less attractive to workers because
their job-finding probability is lower. As the contract value for the worker
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rises, the declining job-finding probability eventually begins to dominate the
rising contract value, and a unique optimal level of promised value balances
these effects. Therefore, there is a unique equilibrium search market for each
(z, h).
C.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Let’s consider two distinct values of aggregate productivity z1 < z2. At
z2, the firm can adopt the optimal contract at z1, which is feasible and de-
livers the same value V to the worker. As the transition matrix of z is
assumed to be monotone23, this strategy generates a higher expected profit
than Πh (s, z1, V ) – the pareto frontier at z1. As this strategy has to be
at most equal to Πh (s, z2, V ) – the pareto frontier at z2, we have that
Πh (s, z1, V ) < Π
h (s, z2, V ).
C.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The first-order conditions for firm problem are
βEszΠh
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
= ηc′′ (e) (23)
∂eEszΠh
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
∂V hs′z′
+ ewγsz + η = 0 (24)
where η is the multiplier on the incentive-compatibility constraint. The en-
velope condition is
∂Πh (s, z, V )
∂V
= −wγsz (25)
23A transition matrix is called monotone if each row stochastically dominates the row
above.
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From (23) and (24) I obtain
−
∂eEszΠh
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
∂V hs′z′
− ewγsz =
βEszΠh
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
c′′ (e)
From envelope condition (25), I substitute the first term on the left with
the wage next period and get Equation (13).
C.4 Proof of Lemma 2
In the model, a higher level of specific capital is equivalent to a higher initial
productivity gap τ and a lower upgrading probability φ. Let’s consider two
distinct levels of specific capital ξ1 =
(
τh1 , φ
h
1
)
and ξ2 =
(
τh2 , φ
h
2
)
. ξ2 represents
a higher level of specific capital comparing to ξ1, i.e. the initial productivity
gap τh2 > τ
h
1 , and the upgrading probability φ
h
2 < φ
h
1 . From Equation (5), we
have the expected firm profit from hiring a trainee
Πh (0, z, V ; ξi) = hz−τhi −w+βeEz
[
φhiΠ
h (1, z′,W1z′) +
(
1− φhi
)
Πh (0, z′,W0z′)
]
At ξ1 – the lower level of specific capital, the firm can adopt the op-
timal contract at ξ2, which is feasible and delivers the same value V to
the trainee. Due to more output and higher upgrading probability from
trainees to skilled workers, this strategy generates a higher expected firm
profit than Πh (0, z, V ; ξ2) – the pareto frontier at ξ2. As this strategy has to
be at most equal to Πh (0, z, V ; ξ1) – the pareto frontier at ξ1, we have that
Πh (0, z, V ; ξ2) < Π
h (0, z, V ; ξ1).
C.5 Proof of Proposition 2
From Lemma 2, the expected profit from a new job next period (matched
with a trainee) EzΠh
(
0, z′, V̂ h0z′
)
at ξ2 is smaller than that at ξ1 in every
queue in the search market. From Equation (21), the job finding rate in a
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sub-market
(
θ̂hz ,EzV̂ h0z′
)
is an increasing function of EzΠh
(
0, z′, V̂ h0z′
)
. Then,
more specific capital reduces a firm’s incentive to post vacancies, leading to
a decrease in the job finding rate in every sub-market. Thus, the unique
equilibrium search markets for each (z, h) at ξ2 offers a lower value than that
at ξ1. This is consistent with Becker (1962) that costs of acquiring specific
capital are shared between workers and firms. Therefore, by Equation (12),
the value of the worker’s outside options at ξ2 is lower than that at at ξ1.
Finally, by Equation (4), as the effort cost function is increasing and strictly
convex, the optimal effort level of skilled workers at ξ2 is lower than that at
ξ1.
C.6 Wage-tenure Profiles
Different levels of specific capital also have different implications for wage-
tenure profiles. These implications can be summarized by plotting the wage-
tenure profiles by education, which are displayed in Figure 5. The solid line
depicts the postgraduate wage against current job tenure, and the dashed
line depicts the undergraduate wage. As each series is logged and demeaned,
the results show the percentage deviation from the mean. For both education
groups, the wage-tenure profiles are upward sloping. The gap between the
starting wage of postgraduates and their average wage is greater than that of
undergraduates.24 This can also be seen in the column “Baseline” of Table
11, where the percent wage loss after displacement for postgraduates is -
0.176, and that for undergraduates is about -0.089. The third row of column
“Low Capital” of Table 11 shows that when postgraduates have the same
low level of specific capital as undergraduates, the immediate wage loss after
displacement changes from -0.176 to -0.083, which is almost the same to
undergraduates.
24The starting wage is the wage of the first month of the new job.
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Figure 5: Compare Wage-tenure Profiles by Education
Figure 5 also shows that wage growth is rapid during the early stage of
employment, and is faster for postgraduates than that for undergraduates. In
fact, the first year of job tenure raises the postgraduate wage by 7 percent and
the undergraduate wage by 5 percent, and the first 10 years (120 months) of
job tenure raise the postgraduate wage by 21 percent and the undergraduate
wage by 11 percent.25 Hence, as postgraduates have more specific capital,
their starting wage on a new job is relatively low, but subsequent wage growth
is faster.
D Evaluating Other Potential Explanations
This section evaluates the plausibility of other potential explanations for the
counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium.
25Topel (1991) estimates that 10 years of job tenure raise the wage by 25%. Altonji and
Williams (2005) place the tenure effect on wages at 11% per decade.
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D.1 Relative Supply
One possibility for why the postgraduate wage premium is counter-cyclical
is that the relative supply of postgraduates to undergraduates declines in
recessions, and thus, the postgraduate wage increases relative to the under-
graduate wage. Therefore, I test whether the relative supply of postgraduates
to undergraduates is pro-cyclical.
Figure 6 plot the detrended real GDP and the relative supply of postgrad-
uates to undergraduates. I restrict the sample to male workers aged 26-64.
To detrend, I use a Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter with parameter 100. NBER
dated recessions are shaded. The relative supply of postgraduates to under-
graduates increases in all of the recessions except the recent Great Recession,
and its correlation with real GDP is -0.32, indicating that the relative supply
of postgraduates to undergraduates is counter-cyclical.
Figure 6: Detrended Real GDP and the Relative Supply of PG to BA
NBER recessions are shaded. Series are logged and detrended using a Hodrick–
Prescott (HP) filter with parameter 100.
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D.2 Differences in the Profitability of Jobs
A possible explanation for why postgraduates have smaller cyclical wage
shocks than their undergraduate counterparts might be related to the higher
profitability of their jobs. In the terminology of search models, postgraduates
might have a lower flow value of unemployment. In my baseline simulation,
I ruled out this possibility by assuming the proportionality between the flow
value of unemployment and the amount of general skills across education
groups in Equation 18.
Here I relax the proportionality assumption between postgraduates and
undergraduates. To test this hypothesis, I first assign postgraduates and
undergraduates the same level of specific capital. Then, instead of assuming
the flow value of unemployment for postgraduates as bPG = b∗hPG = 0.557∗
1.222 = 0.681, I search for the value of bPG that generates the empirical
elasticity of postgraduate wage to GDP. I find bPG = 0.172, which is smaller
than that in the baseline. The simulation results, reported in the column
“Profit” of Table 16, indicate that postgraduates have less wage cyclicality
than undergraduates. However, the model now counterfactually predicts
higher job finding rates for postgraduates than undergraduates. Intuitively,
since postgraduate jobs yield higher profit, firms are willing to post more
vacancies in this segment of the labour market, leading in turn to higher
labour market tightness and job finding rates.
D.3 Differences in Hiring Costs
Another possible explanation might be that postgraduates have higher hiring
costs. In my baseline simulation, I already assumed that the vacancy posting
cost grew proportionally with the amount of general skills in Equation 17.
However, it might understate the true differences in hiring costs between
postgraduates and undergraduates.
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Table 16: Other Potential Explanations
Moments Data Baseline Profit Hiring
Postgraduates
Job separation rate .005 .005 .005 .004
Job finding rate .245 .248 .351 .099
Elasticity of median wage to GDP .34 .322 .34 .34
Undergraduates
Job separation rate .009 .009 .009 .009
Job finding rate .263 .263 .263 .263
Elasticity of median wage to GDP .58 .58 .58 .58
I assign postgraduates and undergraduates the same level of specific cap-
ital. I search for the value of ηPG that generates the empirical postgraduate
wage elasticity instead of assuming proportionality, i.e. ηPG = η ∗ hPG =
7.324 ∗ 1.222 = 8.95. I find ηPG = 516, which is much larger than that in the
baseline. The simulation results, reported in the column “Hiring” of Table
16, indicate that postgraduates have less wage cyclicality than undergrad-
uates. However, the model now counterfactually predicts much lower job
finding rates for postgraduates than the data predict. Intuitively, since it is
costlier to hire postgraduates, firms will post fewer vacancies in this labour
market segments. As a result, their job finding rate drops.
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